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The Total Operations Management for Safety Critical Activities
(TOSCA) project is aimed at developing a safety management
framework that integrates best practices, tools and methods for
functional analysis, risk assessment, interactive emergency
scenarios analysis, performance monitoring, design review,
training and knowledge management. The TOSCA approach is
described by a T-model based around a central ‘Common
Operational Picture’ (COP) that holds information regarding the
operational system, and is used to support risk assessment and
management. The information held in the COP may be represented
in different ways but should be accessible to all stakeholders in
order to analyse and communicate risk, and to support training and
procedure design.

Total Safety Management
Over the recent past, the accumulation of major mishaps, crises and accidents
have made it clear that organisations must still improve their capabilities to
address safety not as a stand-alone activity that is separate from the main
activities and processes of the organisation but as an integrated part of total
performance management. Total Safety Management uses the basis of Total
Quality Management to drive safety within an organisation (Herrero et al, 2002),
but in contrast to quality management, Total Safety Management influences
performance, quality and safety resulting in a much wider beneficial effect
(Cooper & Phillips, 1995).
It is essential that we understand how weaknesses in the technical processes
combine with flaws in organisational interfaces and give rise to significant losses
and major industrial accidents. The traditional fields of practice, such as risk
analysis (RA) and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA), have often been rooted
in simplified accident models and failed to conduct a functional analysis that
takes into account any dependencies between technical, human and
organisational processes. In addition, traditional RAs and PSAs have not

provided robust solutions because they have not been embedded within a ‘total
operations’ or ‘performance management’ framework to deliver solutions that
are both innovative and safe. It is not sufficient that production systems are
reliable (i.e., their failure probability is acceptably low) but they must also be
resilient and capable of recovering from irregular variations, disruptions and
degradation of working conditions. It is often the case that system vulnerability
and resilience arise from the same interactions between socio-technical
dimensions. Thus, the mechanisms that create vulnerabilities and resilience cut
across traditional disciplinary borders, e.g., engineering, sociology, psychology
and political science.
In the last decade, there has been an increasing interest in occupational health
and safety in Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) accompanied by many
European projects supporting their viability (see European Agency for Safety
and Health at Work Report 2005). The majority of studies in the literature have
found that SMEs have an increased risk of accidents compared to large
enterprises. However, Sørensen et al. (2007) found that this relationship only
holds for SMEs that are independent; in contrast, for SMEs that are part of larger
organizations, the work environment does not seem to present more hazards than
the large enterprises. Another survey conducted in Italy (i.e., 84 small-sized and
25 medium-sized enterprises responded to a questionnaire) reported on the
importance of SMEs’ perception of safety and identified current safety
management priorities and methods. Micheli and Cagno (2009) found that,
although 80% of SMEs claimed that safety was among their main priorities, they
reported problems in planning safety interventions because of limited financial
resources, lack of management tools and a burden of compliance with
regulations and codes. SMEs focused their investments on issues associated
with purely regulatory or legislative aspects, that is, (1) training and information
of workers on safety, (2) upgrading installations to comply with safety standards,
and (3) introducing safer production technologies and personal protective
equipment. A tendency was observed among SMEs to outsource safety
management to compensate for the lack of specific competences within the
enterprise; this tendency was greater in small-sized enterprises. Therefore, SMEs
can gain a lot of benefits in safety and performance by developing a capacity to
risk assess actual operations with a practical and resilient methodology as well as
a capacity for monitoring operational data in a solution embedded in their
everyday data collection process.
The Total Operations Management for Safety Critical Activities (TOSCA)
project is a European Project within the context of the 7th Framework Program
aimed at developing an innovative approach to integrate and enhance safety,
quality and productivity, especially for SMEs in the process industry. The scope
of TOSCA is to establish an economically suitable framework in which the most
innovative tools and techniques (e.g. advanced 3D software, virtual reality,
innovative theoretical models, updated information exchange protocols, etc.) are
used together in order to take advantage of possible synergies in processing

human factors requirements, fulfilling regulations, improving safety and
enhancing productivity.
To achieve this, the project is developing a theoretical framework for Total
Safety Management in the process industry, particularly focused on SME
applications. The aim is to better define and highlight the needs of the industry
regarding the development of an integrated methodology for assessing safety,
quality and operations management.

Safety Management
Safety management has traditionally focused on correcting safety concerns,
problems, or hazards and taking the necessary steps to bring the system back to
normal operation. Existing safety approaches seem to rely on what is commonly
known as closed-loop feedback control. Therefore, we need to develop a new
approach that not only solves out discrepancies between safety goals and current
states but also helps us understand the current state of operations and risks
involved in a plant. If stakeholders are able to develop a common picture of
operations and risks then they are in a better position to anticipate the effects of
corrective actions and risk mitigations. In order to develop this anticipatory or
proactive capability, our safety approach should rely on an internal model of the
process that predicts the future state of the process and compares alternative
actions in terms of effectiveness and cost. This type of model-driven feedback
control enables safety analysts to cope with an overload of information and direct
attention to critical events in a timely fashion. Safety practitioners should be able
to monitor what could become a threat in the near-term and what could impair
their abilities to respond (internal performance). This monitoring capability is
supported by a common picture of how the technical process works, how people
organize their jobs and how the environment can affect the process and the
people.
Several activities that are critical from a safety or productivity perspective may
require a strong coordination between many agents (e.g., safety managers,
supervisors, operators and external contractors) as well as communication of
information regarding possible side-effects, threats and escalation of events.
This ‘knowledge transformation’ process requires that data and information are
systematically managed and integrated with people’s knowledge of the
functioning of the system. Building a common picture of opportunities and
threats will allow different agents to understand the systemic causes of safety
issues and provide a basis for suggesting practical interventions.
The requirements for safety management in existing and upcoming standards and
regulations (example ISO 31000 and its related upcoming revisions, Seveso II
directive etc.) call for a proactive strategic approach, demonstrating a capacity to
anticipate risks and keep safety at the centre of changes driven by commercial
competition as well as ensuring that evidence collected through risk analysis
becomes an effective driver of innovation and change. This is particularly

important for Major Hazardous Activities where prevention and mitigation are
necessary for survival and where the complexity of organizations requires a
‘system of systems’ perspective. However, there is currently a gap between the
principles stated in the available standards and regulations and the actual
roadmaps to their implementation. Organisations, especially the safety critical
ones, find it difficult to integrate their different functional units in a common
programme of operations management.

COMPRIS
A Common Operational Picture is a single source, usually a display, of relevant
operational information. The term originates from the military domain where it is
used to describe the complete graphical picture of the battlefield used by
commanders to make effective command decisions (Looney, 2001). The aim of a
common operational picture is to share situation awareness among distributed
stakeholders and the concept has also been applied in emergency management
and humanitarian crisis management (McNeese et al, 2006). TOSCA applies this
concept to safety management, and is developing a Common Operations
Management and Risk Information System (COMPRIS). COMPRIS provides a
representation of information and knowledge about the operational system that
can be used to support risk assessment and safety management. The information
may be represented in different ways, but should be accessible to all stakeholders
involved in a project in order to analyse and communicate risk, and to support
training and job design.
In terms of control theory, COMPRIS is a ‘mental model of how the system
works’ that guides the application of a safety management system (SMS) in
everyday practice. In this respect, COMPRIS is a ‘mental model’ of how a
specific SMS works, what risks are significant at a particular area, what methods
should be used to assess risks, what uncertainties exist in a risk evaluation, and
what risk mitigation measures can be chosen to reduce risk to acceptable levels.
Establishing COMPRIS, or a ‘risk picture’, involves a useful synthesis of the risk
assessment, with the intention to provide understandable information to the
relevant decision-makers and users about the risk and the risk assessment
performed. The ‘risk picture’ shall be understandable by all relevant personnel,
decision makers as well as engineering and/or operating personnel. This may be
achieved with the use of tailored documentation and presentations to different
groups of internal and external stakeholders. The presentation and documentation
of the risk picture shall be a comprehensive, balanced, many-facetted and holistic
picture of the risk associated with facilities and operations.
COMPRIS is an internal model that addresses how safety is measured and what
‘performance indicators’ will be monitored to measure not only the ‘final
outcome’ but also ‘antecedents’ so that changes are made before undesired
outcomes are produced. Performance indicators provide a good basis for
integrating measures of safety with productivity and quality control. Figure 1

shows s model-driven safety management system that comprise four functions
from resilience engineering (i.e., REPOND – MONITOR - ANTICIPATE and
LEARN):
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Figure 1: The role of COMPRIS within a safety management system
1.

2.

3.

4.

Given a specified safety goal, the safety practitioner has to RESPOND
take control action that changes the technical process in order to
produce the desired output; in turn this is measured by suitable indexes
and by feedback (MONITOR).
COMPRIS (i.e., the internal model of the process) also needs to enable
safety practitioners to ANTICIPATE disturbances so that actions are
taken before they occur. The advantage here is that control actions can
prevent adverse events from taking place or intervene before their
consequences have had time to spread to other parts.
Safety practitioners must be also able to control threats from internal
variability due to fatigue of personnel, changes in team composition,
unavailability of tools and so forth.
Safety practitioners must be able to LEARN from experience which
includes many changes in the internal model of the process.

Individual companies have different approaches to building their ‘understanding
of risks and risk control measures’ depending on the resources invested in safety
management. SMEs may have greater problems than large companies in getting
an accurate ‘COMPRIS’ (or ‘understanding’) of their risks and the possible
measures to control risks. Among other reasons, SMEs are more diversified than
large companies and this makes it difficult to draw on what risk information
already exists in the specific industry domain they operate. There is a need
therefore to examine the scope of COMPRIS in both SMEs and large companies.

Application of COMPRIS
There is limited information on ‘what constitutes a common operational picture’
in a SMS. There has been a tendency to consider the ‘risk registry’ and the ‘risk
acceptance criteria’ as a common operating picture so that all stakeholders and
operators are aware of the whole spectrum of risks in a company. However, it is
interesting to ask whether the common picture should also address the risk
analysis tools used to identify risks, their limitations, the kind of analysts
participated in the risk analysis, and the influence of the conditions under which
the analysis took place. Other issues concern the level of detail that should be
presented about risk items such as, the description of risks, the possible risk
control measures, the responsible persons etc. Different people have their own
boundaries of responsibility and it becomes time consuming to consider any
‘risks’ in other areas beyond their responsibilities. We can view the common
operational picture as a database of risk information that should be accessible to
key players but ‘who should see what information’ remains a challenging issue
to be resolved. In TOSCA a set of methods and tools are used to establish the
COMPRIS and produce a robust risk assessment (Fig. 2). These include:
•
•
•

Task design and high-level functional hazard analysis using a
participatory approach. This can be achieved with a modified Business
Process Modelling (BPM) approach.
Operational risk screening in order to feed in the results of functional
analysis into bow-tie diagrams to identify important technical and
human barriers that prevent or control industrial hazards.
Quantified risk assessment for complex scenarios using tools, such as
traditional fault trees or computational fluid dynamics, for consequence
and likelihood assessment.
Risk
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Figure 2: TOSCA methods and tools to establish COMPRIS

The results of risk analysis can be tested in workplace prototyping tools that
create virtual workplaces for operators to interact with planned designs or
changes in a 3D virtual representation. 3D maps of the site can also be used to
display risk information in an accessible format, including critical risk areas and
key safety barriers. Many SMEs complain that risk assessment is a complicated
process that can be done only once during the design stage. Updating the risk
assessment process every time there is a change management program is very
cumbersome. For this reason, TOSCA builds a tool for managing and visualizing
safety knowledge. Finally, TOSCA builds a risk registry for collecting data,
monitoring risks and communicating safety knowledge. The risk registry is based
on the concept of building a ‘business case for safety’ where the values of safety
are seen beyond the traditional reduction of risks to establish connections with
quality and productivity.

Current applications and future developments.
The TOSCA T-model © describes the Common Operational Picture at the heart
of TOSCA safety management, and links this picture to a design loop and an
operational loop (Fig. 3). The design loop applies the TOSCA tools to the
design of new plant sections, the management of technical and organizational
changes, and the risk analysis of critical activities. The operational loops applies
the methods and tools to the management of safety barriers, the design of
workflows, coordination of teams, and training. Modular products to deliver
safety management are under development for each area of the framework

Figure 3: TOSCA Total Safety Management Framework©
To follow up the development and the testing of the TOSCA methodology in the
three main sections and the deployment of the tools to support it within the
project we have currently chosen to develop five test beds to test the

effectiveness of the proposed approaches in the areas identified. The test beds
include the use of process mapping and task analysis to improve risk assessments
for a food processing organisation, the establishment of a risk register and a set
of KPIs to support hazard identification and risk monitoring in a energy
generation company, the development of a 3D risk map to be used as a
knowledge and risk management system for a company producing fertilizers, the
use of rapid prototyping to optimise a rare testing procedure for a LPG storage
organisation, and the use of VR to review and train operators and contractors for
loading and unloading of cryogenic liquids. Three of the test beds will be
conducted in SMEs, allowing the TOSCA approach to be tailored and tested for
small enterprises as well as large ones. The results of the first phase of testing
will be used to refine the individual tools and techniques deployed, as well as the
overall approach and the concept of COMPRIS.
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